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UNITED STATES v. NIXON:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*
I. FOREWORD
by D.S. Hobbs**
Professor Raoul Berger has made important and timely contributions
to the argument surrounding executive privilege. His Executive Privi-
lege: A Constitutional Myth (1974)1 and a plethora of related articles2
constitute a broadside attack on those who have argued that there is an
implied presidential power to withhold information from the other
branches of government. His conclusion is that the historical evidence
supports no such power. According to Berger, what has become com-
monly accepted as "executive privilege" is in fact a "myth," created by
executive partisans and naively nurtured by numerous commentators.
The paper, which is the subject of the roundtable discussion in this issue
of the Review, represents Berger's summary of his thesis as seen in the
aftermath of United States v. Nixon.
3
Mr. Berger's argument has been widely commented upon in the law
reviews. Since these comments have been primarily by lawyers, 4 it is
most appropriate that the Review afford Berger a forum-with a format
of his choosing5 -to air his ideas in the company of historians.
* The main paper by Professor Berger, and the comments by Professors Ellis,
Benedict, and Lofgren were originally delivered before a meeting of the Organization
of American Historians, Boston, Massachusetts, April 17, 1975. The replies by Profes-
sor Berger were written subsequent to this meeting.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. R. BERGER, ExEcUTIvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSITrUTIONAL MYTH (1974) [hereinafter
cited as BERGER].
2. See Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv.
865 (1975); Berger, Executive Privilege: A Reply to Professor Sofaer, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 603 (1975); Berger, Executive Privilege, Professor Rosenblum, and the Higher
Criticism, 1975 DUE L.. 921; Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Incarnation of Executive Privilege];
Berger, Executive Privilege and Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1044
(1965); Berger, Executive Privilege: Some Counter Criticism, 44 U. CnqN. L. REv. 166
(1975); Berger, The President, Congress and the Courts, 83 YALE L.. 1111 (1974).
3. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
4. Of the reviewers cited in notes 6-10 infra, all but Rosenblum, who is both a
professor of law and a political scientist, are either law professors or practicing attorneys.
5. It is interesting that now that Professor Berger finally has been provided an
opportunity to publish his debate with historians, he has demanded a format closely
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
In the roundtable, Professors Michael Les Benedict and Richard E.
Ellis suggest, to Berger's evident annoyance, that his is not the only
reading of history. Lest the sensitive reader be surprised by the vitupera-
tive, ad hominem nature of Berger's responses to their insightful and
largely generous comments, it should perhaps be noted that Berger's
style bears a remarkable resemblance to that of a not-so-disinterested
M.P. during the question period in the House of Commons, and has
been variously described as "self-important and petulant,"" "decidedly
tilted,"7 "wholly one-sided," "combative,"" and "adversary."' 0
Before remarking briefly upon the question of Berger's historical
analysis, which is raised by Benedict and Ellis, I should like to comment
on an interesting query in Professor Charles A. Lofgren's paper, to
which Berger elected not to respond.
The question which intrigues Lofgren is "why" United States v.
Nixon was written the way it was, with a presumptive executive privilege
simply assumed. He suggests that the opinion, which is lacking in
reasoned elaboration, was a committee-drafted compromise effort, in-
spired at least in part by a desire to present a united front in view of the
uncertainty regarding presidential compliance." The explanation cer-
resembling that of a trial where the moving party enjoys the first and last word. This
perhaps is an odd posture for one who bristles, as does Berger, when it is even suggested
that his history is advocacy. On the other hand, such a stance is of course not
unreasonable if one is convinced that historical evidence is amenable to final and binding
judgment.
6. Winter, Book Review, 83 YALE LJ. 1730, 1734 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Winter]. For a reply, see Berger, Executive Privilege: Some Counter Criticism, 44 U.
CIN&. L. REV. 166 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Counter Criticism].
7. Albert, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1360 (1974). For a reply, see Counter
Criticism, supra note 6, at 182 et seq.
8. Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 281, 284 (1975). For a reply, see Berger,
Executive Privilege: A Reply to Professor So!aer, 75 COLJM. L. REV. 603 (1975).
9. Richman, Book Review, 27 STAN. L. REv. 489, 494 (1975).
10. Rosenblum, Book Review, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 653 (1974). Unlike the reviewers
cited in notes 6-9 supra, Professor Rosenblum had very little but praise for EXECUTIVE
PmxViE o. For his flattery, Rosenblum is rewarded with a sermon about his failure to
note the incompatibility between United States v. Nixon and the Berger thesis. Berger,
Executive Privilege, Professor Rosenblum, and the Higher Cricitcism, 1975 DUKE LJ.
921.
11. Professor Lofgren calls attention to Mr. St. Clair's statements at oral argument
which note that the President has his obligations under the Constitution. The Court may
have been more impressed with the White House announcement of July, 1973, that the
President would obey only a "definitive" Supreme Court ruling and the President's
subsequent refusal to define "definitive". See Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A
Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 76, 77 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Mishkin].
UNITED STATES v. NIXON
tainly makes sense, and is in accord with what little we know about High
Court behavior in novel and delicate cases of great moment.
I am not, however, sure that Lofgren is on target when he suggests
that in deciding to compromise and conceal its internal disagreements
the Court underestimated or misread its support in the "national constit-
uency" of public opinion. It seems equally plausible that the Court cor-
rectly perceived that public opinion was united only on the limited prop-
osition that the unindicted co-conspirator, who was just coincidentally
the President, should turn over the so-called Watergate tapes, and that
there was no consensus on the broader question of the nature of presi-
dential authority and the separation of powers in the abstract. If the
Court anticipated public support that was essentially result oriented and
thus saw its role as that of the Nation's constitutional schoolmaster, its
opinion in United States v. Nixon was a triumph in many respects. With
a broad stroke of the judicial pen the Court succeeded in resolving a
stubborn controversy; reminding both the President and the Nation with
an understandable, albeit overly simplistic, argument that it is a govern-
ment of Laws in this Land; preserving the authority of the presidential
office with a display of dignified deference; maintaining its posture of
neutrality by avoiding any reference to the incumbent President's possi-
ble involvement in the Watergate coverup; and reaffirming its own
institutional autonomy.
1 2
These considerations may explain the opinion; but of course they do
not justify it. Normally we do not expect the Court to use an opinion as
a vehicle for returning the country to normalcy and concord or, for that
matter, for protecting its own institutional interests.'Whether this partic-
ular lapse, whatever -the causes may in fact be, from principled adjudica-
tion can be justified is a difficult question. One does not have to accept
Berger's pristine view of constitutional exegesis to be troubled by the
Court's apparent attempt to mass the country in order to facilitate a
political settlement.
In assessing the Court's performance it is worth bearing in mind,
additionally, that unlike many other opinions which have allegedly
lacked a principled foundation, United States v. Nixon, with all its ipse
dixits and assorted dicta, probably has not committed either the Court or
the country to very much in the way of constitutional doctrine which
12. See generally Mishkin, supra note 11. Professor Mishkin has presented, by far, the
most thorough elaboration and evaluation of the political considerations involved in
United States v. Nixon.
1975]
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extends beyond the Watergate matter.18 All that we have been told is
that the presumptive "presidential privilege" based on the need for
"confidentiality" gives way to the ends of our system of criminal jus-
tice.14 How the privilege will fare when, for example, the balance
involves demands for information in the context of civil litigation,", a
congressional inquiry'8 (including impeachment), a presidential asser-
tion of a privilege based on the necessity to protect military, diplomatic
or sensitive national security secrets' 7 or an alleged need to protect the
"confidentiality" of communications involving low level bureaucrats' 8 is
apparently left to the future. The essentially ad hoc nature of the
decision makes it, at least for the present, readily distinguishable from
the Court's handicraft in, for example, Brown v. Board of Education,9
Miranda v. Arizona,20 Abington School District v. Schempp2 ' or Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 22 which involved long range national commitments to
broad, much debated policies.
Before leaving the question raised in the comments of Berger and
Lofgren concerning the merits of the opinion in Nixon, several points
might well be made.
(1) The question-begging in the opinion does not displease only
those who support the Berger view of executive privilege. The Court
subjected the President's view to an equally short shrift treatment. The
President claimed-not without respectable support2 8-- that the Consti-
13. See Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses but the Presidency Largely
Prevails, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 40 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Henkin].
14. 418 U.S. at 712-13.
15. "We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized
interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation .
Id. at 712 n.19.
16. "We are not here concerned with ... congressional demands for information
." Id. There would appear to be nothing in Nixon which would preclude a future
court from holding that the need for information by Congress always outweighed the
President's need for confidentiality.
17. "We are not here concerned with . . . the President's interest in preserving state
secrets." Id. But see id. at 706, to the effect that a claim of national security might
preclude in camera inspection of requested evidence (dictum).
18. The Court's confidentiality argument is based on a "valid need for protection of
communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them . . . ." Id. at 705 (emphasis added). The question is: "[How high is 'high'."
Incarnation of Executive Privilege, supra note 2, at 22.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
22. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23. See Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and
[Vol. 9
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tution dictated that the final determination about what executive infor-
mation was available to the other branches was a matter of absolute
presidential discretion. This assertion of an absolute privilege was quite
summarily rejected on the authority of references to Baker v. Cart24 and
to Marbury v. Madison25 to the effect that it was emphatically the func-
tion of the judicial branch to determine what the "law" is.6 This is hard-
ly responsive to the President's argument that the "law" controlling the
case mandated executive "discretion." To say that the Court "decides
who decides" does not explain why the "who" is not the executive.
27
(2) Mr. Lofgren prefaces his criticism of Nixon with a reference to
the fact that (unlike Chief Justice Burger in Nixon) John Marshall in
the quite "unremarkable" case of Marbury v. Madison "went to some
lengths to defend his position." The great Chief Justice's argument
for judicial review, however lengthy, is remarkable precisely because of
its question-begging quality.2" United States v. Nixon and Marbury v.
Madison, it might be added, have more in common than question-
begging. Just as John Marshall's opinion sacrificed William Marbury's
commission to the political whim of Madison and Jefferson in exchange
for judicial review and the power to mandamus executive officers in the
performance of their "ministerial" duties, Warren Burger's opinion left
Richard Nixon's presidential tenure exposed to the harsh and ultimately
fatal judgment of public opinion in return for the recognition of execu-
tive privilege and the authority of the Court to determine the scope of
that privilege. If the Marshall opinion fared better in the short run, it is
only because there were no law reviews in 1803.
Professors Benedict and Ellis are in good company when they suggest
that Berger wrenches more out of history than is justified by the
evidence. Although the early response to Berger's Executive Privilege
the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 30, 34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther].
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. 418 U.S. at 704-05.
27. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 34-35; Karst & Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative
and Judicial Review, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 47, 55-56 (1974) ihereinafter cited as Karst &
Horowitz].
28. "Marbury v. Madison in essence begs the question [of the Court's authority]." A.
BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 2 (1962) (noting the similar critiques of Robert
G. McCloskey, Judge Learned Hand, Thomas Reed Powell, and James Bradley Thayer).
Contrary to Lofgren's claim, Marshall's justification of judicial review is not more
lengthy than Burger's argument for a presumptive executive privilege. The judicial re-
view argument takes up five pages in 1 Cranch; the executive privilege argument is made
in ten pages of the U.S. Reports.
1975]
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was, as its author likes to remind us, laudatory,29 subsequent examina-
tions, mostly in the law reviews, have for the most part been highly
critical.30 I suspect that the harshness of many of the reviews has as much
to do with Berger's rhetorical style as with the substance of his argu-
ment. A polemical and tendentiously stated thesis is likely to draw
response in kind, especially when it can be anticipated that its author
will answer even the most circumspect criticism with ill-humored intol-
erance.
31
Both Benedict and Ellis correctly absolve Berger of the charge that
he selectively marshals evidence to reach a predetermined result. (Ben-
edict's employment of the phrase "lawyers' history" to describe Berger's
history is, I believe, simply loose usage, to which Berger responds with
exaggerated hurt.) Their quarrel with Berger, if I understand them
correctly, is that his reading of history does not sufficiently acknowledge
the possibility of ambiguity. In other words, Berger has no preconcep-
tion about the "true understanding" of executive privilege, but rather an
implicit faith that there must have been a definitive understanding.
Thus Berger presents evidence which shows, inter alia, that the Found-
ers had a general expressed attachment to Parliamentary precedents, a
broad power of congressional inquiry, and open government-attach-
ments which are clearly logically incompatible with a belief in an unqual-
ified executive privilege-as supporting the proposition that the Fram-
ers were unequivocally opposed to any privilege whatsoever. What Bene-
dict and Ellis conclude is that while Berger has refuted the royalist posi-
tion that the executive privilege is absolute, the historical evidence does
not conclusively support the argument that the Framers clearly intended
that the executive have no constitutionally based privilege. For them
the evidence permits various inferences.
For example, Benedict argues Jefferson's notes of a Cabinet meeting
during the St. Clair incident show that Washington and his Cabinet con-
cluded that the President had the right to withhold from Congress papers,
"the disclosure of which would injure the public."32 Berger rejects this as
"precedent" and considers the Cabinet discussion "academic" because
Washington did turn over all papers; because Jefferson misunderstood
the Walpole precedent, upon which the Cabinet, in part, relied; and be-
cause the Jefferson notes were not "exhumed" until 1957.13 All of the
29. See, e.g., Incarnation of Executive Privilege, supra note 2, at 11 n.40.
30. See, e.g., notes 6-9 supra.
31. See, e.g., Berger's replies to his critics, cited in notes 6-8, 10 supra.
32. Berger, supra note 1, at 168.
33. Id. at 168-69.
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observations are correct. Yet, as Professor Winters has elsewhere ar-
gued,34 this does not derogate from the fact that Jefferson's memo re-
flected the views of President Washington, Secretary of the Treasury
Hamilton, and Attorney General Randolph, all prominent members of
the Constitutional Convention, who agreed that there was at least some
executive discretion to withhold information.
Further, as Ellis notes, during the discussion of the Jay Treaty, Wash-
ington refused to turn over papers to the House on the ground that it had
no role in treaty-making, and argued that if the House wanted the papers
for impeachment, it must expressly so state. Madison, then a member of
the House,
thought it clear that the House must have a right, in all cases, to ask
for information which might assist their deliberations .... He was
as ready to admit that the Executive had a right, under a due responsi-
bility, also, to withhold information, when of a nature that did not per-
mit a disclosure at the time ...
If the Executive conceived that, in relation to his own department, pa-
pers could not be safely communicated, he might, on that ground, refuse
them, because he was the competent though responsible judge within his
own department.8 5
Professor Berger responds to this evidence by arguing that Washing-
ton asserted no general right to withhold information. "That Washing-
ton should thus have attempted to limit the powers of the House rather
than to insist on executive privilege suggests a doubt whether he could
safely invoke such an executive power."36 As for Madison's statement,
which was first introduced into the executive privilege debate by Berger,
it is thrust aside primarily because Madison's position was rejected by
the House.3 7 Madison, who Berger acknowledges elsewhere as the prin-
cipal architect of the Constitution, 8 is somehow discounted because he
was outvoted by a transient House majority, a group, it should be noted,
whose principal spokesmen were not at the Founding in Philadelphia.
34. Winter, supra note 6, at 1733.
35. Id. at 174, quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 773 (2d ed. 1834).
36. Id. at 172.
37. Id. at 177-79. Berger seems to think it significant that Madison agreed that the
"meaning of the Constitution would be established, as far as depends on the vote of the
House of Representatives." Id. at 177 n.89. However, all Madison's statement shows is
(1) that he agreed to the undeniable proposition that a majority of the House determined
the House's constitutional position; and (2) that his own argument was derived from the
Constitution.
38. Id. at 61.
1975]
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This brief review of some of the evidence suggests that the historical
facts are not so clear, and that there is much room for intepretation. Any
interpretation must address itself to some thorny problems-problems
appropriate for the historians but not, I would argue, for the Court. To
begin with, there is the question of how much weight is to be accorded
a given statement. For example, how much relative weight is to be as-
signed James Wilson's repeated references to Congress as the "Grand
Inquest of the Nation" and Madison's quoted statement in the House?
Berger seems, in part, to put the latter statement in the "self-serving"
category, which includes comments made in the context of specific dis-
putes between the branches, and thereby to dismiss it.89 But can it realis-
tically be claimed that it was Madison rather than the House that was
mouthing "self-serving" words? In any event, there is not much con-
stitutional history left if self-interested remarks are excluded.
Additionally, given that words and deeds must be interpreted, pri-
mary reliance upon such evidence raises the question of whether the
correct inference has been drawn. For example, is it not possible that
for political, i.e., "self-serving" purposes, Washington chose to argue
the narrower ground of the House's limited power rather than to assert
a broad claim of executive privilege? Berger's interpretation of this
incident indicates how one can have it both ways: strong assertions of
executive authority can be ridiculed as "self-serving," while more modest
claims can be regarded as statements against interest and thus accorded
the status of "evidence." Berger's assessment may of course be correct.
But the basic question of whether we want the courts to make such subtle
and difficult judgments remains. One may admire Berger's deftness
in dealing with disparite pieces of evidence but still prefer that the
court avoid such speculation.
I simply am unable to see how Berger can advert to any clear intent
on the part of the Framers, when Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton,
Madison, and Randolph all appeared unaware of that intent. To be sure,
Washington turned over the papers, Jefferson's notes were apparently un-
known to contemporaries, and Madison was outvoted in the House. But
how does this evidence account for the fact that they evidently believed,
and clearly so stated, that there was a constitutional power to withhold
information from Congress? Were they dissembling? There is no evi-
dence that they were. Were they believers in the mischievous doctrine
that it was a Constitution they were expounding? They most certainly
were not. As Berger never tires of reminding us, Madison and Jefferson
39. Berger, supra note 1, at 166.
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were early adherents of the view that the Constitution means what the
Framers said it meant. Were they simply mistaken? Perhaps they were;
all men are fallible. But is it likely that they were totally rn-informed
or forgetful about a matter about which there was no doubt in 1789?
These questions are the essence of the debate in which the panelists
engage. In answering these questions for themselves I would hope that
the readers will bear in mind a point Professor Berger made so well in
another context: What the Framers believed is sometimes a better guide
to their intentions than the precedents.40
Mr. Berger has approached history in much the same manner as a
judge in a civil case examines the evidence with a felt sense of the
obligation to decide definitively one way or the other. If history were
the extent of a judge's evidence, Berger has authored an impressive
opinion-and, one might add, a well-circulated opinion. The difficulty
of course is that history is not the only aid to judicial wisdom. In
contrast to Berger, a number of commentators have joined the Court
in eschewing history almost altogether in their analysis of executive
privilege.41 A number 42 have adopted Professor Charles Black's ap-
proach43 and have analyzed the problem in terms of the "structure and
relationship" of our governmental system. A number have simply read
history differently.44
If, as I believe, there is something to be said for the proposition that
the Framers did not consciously consider the problem of executive
privilege in all of its aspects, it is then difficult to agree with Benedict
and Ellis that the Court in Nixon had an obligation to discuss history at
any great length. Protracted essays demonstrating the inconclusive na-
ture of history are not normally the grist of judicial opinions. A footnote
by the Court noting the disagreement between Berger and his adver-
saries over the very existence of a privilege would no doubt please Clio
and amuse Hegel, but it would have added very little to the rationale
of United States v. Nixon.
40. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 45-46 (1969).
41. See, e.g., Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self-Incrimination, and the Separation of
Powers, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 92 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 6; Karst & Horowitz, supra note 27.
43. C. BLACK, SrRuCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1969).
44. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 13, at 44: 'That there is sometimes a public interest
in withholding information has been recognized from our national beginnings .... "
"ITlhere is an executive privilege... as old as our national history. .. .. Id. at 45.
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